INTRODUCTION
Large established companies from a variety of industrial sectors typically show a highly diversified knowledge base. A number of authors have found that this phenomenon can be measured using several technological indicators such as educational data on engineering backgrounds and patent applications (Granstrand and Sjölander, 1990; Patel and Pavitt 1994) . The interesting feature of this trend is that companies invest to acquire competence in areas that are unrelated to their production specialisation in the market. However, this paradoxical empirical pattern is more easily observed than explained. Recently, some explanations have been put forward, one of which is that large innovative firms need to internalise many different branches of engineering knowledge in order to cope with uneven rates of development in the components they rely on (Brusoni et al. 2001 ).
This work draws on the insights of the multi-technology corporation literature (e.g. Granstrand et al. 1997 ) and attempts to complement previous findings with a focus on the dynamic features of technological diversification. The chapter has two main goals: to draw a map of the rate and direction of technological diversification and, on this basis, to nourish a tentative discussion of the forces behind the evolving profile of multi-technology firms. In order to do this we use patent counts and classifications based on the SPRU database for nearly 500 of the world's largest innovating companies from 1980 to 1996, as ranked by sales revenues.
Large companies exhibit significant command of technologies unrelated to the actual making of their principal product lines, i.e., they reveal a degree of technological diversity or 'incoherence' as it is labelled throughout this chapter. Having underlined this contemporary stylised fact, we shall be concerned with the existence of broad changes in the rate and direction of technological diversification across and within industries. We find evidence of an emergent reorganization in corporate technological portfolios. Although the extent to which companies patent outside their core technical fields has remained stable, or even decreased slightly, the composition of the in-house technological mix appears to have changed considerably over a period of less than two decades.
The technologies attracting the diversification movement in corporate capabilities, as revealed by patents, have increasingly become information & communication technologies (ICT) , new materials and drugs & bioengineering. This is not entirely surprising since these technologies are commonly regarded as 'generic technologies' or 'general purpose-technologies'. However, this tendency coincides with a remarkable regularity: for these three technology groups, the growth in patents was consistently higher for non-specialist sectors than for specialist sectors.
Taken together, these findings can be interpreted as evidence that 'new economy' technology fields have gained weight against 'older' technologies, like the chemicals and mechanical fields, within the large established companies of the 'old economy'. The observed patent regularities raise other issues.
In particular, they could provide a useful perspective to an ongoing debate on whether the rise of new technologies has been associated with the substitution of or, on the contrary, complementarity with, older technologies. While there is considerable inter-industry diversity, the pattern of growth in ICT, What is the meaning of this set of changes? On a macroscopic perspective we suggest these developments can be understood as an expression of an ongoing technological revolution in the neoSchumpeterian sense of Freeman and Louçã (2001) . As this paper has a more detailed perspective, we concentrate on the discussion of the strategic rationale behind the dynamics of diversification in the corporate knowledge base. At this stage we offer two intertwined hypotheses that fit with the observations.
The chapter begins by addressing the empirical and conceptual contributions of the literature on technological diversification. Section 3 describes the data set and considers the methodological conditions necessary for a prudent use of patents as indicators of technological capabilities. Section 4 then reports on the analysis of our sample, which constitutes the core of the chapter. Section 5 critically assesses the empirical results, discusses implications for technology management and suggests some unsettled questions for innovation studies. The last section, Section 6, forms the conclusion.
THE CORPORATE TECHNOLOGY MIX

The case of multi-technology firms
The emergence of the large innovative firm, as a fundamental institution of capitalism, is a phenomenon of the 1870s and onwards. Having matured by the 1920s, big business organizations continued to develop throughout the twentieth century and some 'early movers' still continue to play an important role in global markets today, e.g., Ford, Bayer, Shell, etc (Chandler and Daems 1980 ). An enduring characteristic of these modern industrial corporations is the strategy of multi-product lines. This stable corporate facet has also been associated with a 'non-random (coherent) distribution of product portfolios inside firms, and the relative stability in the composition of firm's product portfolios over the long run' (Dosi et al. 1992: 185) .
Another remarkable characteristic of large companies is the wide variety of technologies that is nurtured within them. Evidence indicates that this was not always the case. As the twentieth century went by, the corporate knowledge base became more complex, so that contemporary giants operate in a broader range of technological areas . This seems to suggest that the multitechnology corporation can be seen as a new organisational subspecies of late twentieth century capitalism. Today a company like Ford contributes to the advancement of semiconductors, chemicals and materials, but does not sell computers or raw materials for other companies (Granstrand et al. 1997) . Likewise, tire manufacturers are not the leading sources of polymer science, but they clearly command cutting-edge expertise in the corresponding patent classes (Acha and Brusoni 2002 .
A crucial lesson that emerges from such an insight is that the notion of the multi-technology corporation must be set apart from that of the multi-product corporation. To use the words of Pavitt (1998a: xiv), '(t)he main analytical and policy conclusion is that we should not confuse technologies with products.' Empirical research indeed allows us to say that contemporary big business institutions exhibit a much broader portfolio of technologies or competencies than of products, i.e., they know more than they do (Brusoni et al. 2001) . This suggests the existence of differences between the processes of productive and cognitive division of labour (Pavitt 1998b ).
The product and technology dimensions are distinct, but nevertheless related. A paradigmatic expression of this connection is product evolution towards technological complexity. This has been the case of the iconic artefact of the 1990s, the mobile phone. The number of sub-technologies involved in one case of Ericsson handsets rose from 17 to 29 narrow patent classes from the early to the late 1980s (Granstrand and Sjölander 1992) . Diversification was used in Swedish, Japanese and US companies to improve the degree of sophistication of many types of products in very specific classes (Granstrand 1999) . Thus, the number of new combinations made possible by the technological diversification trend has coincided and been reinforced by the tendency towards more complex products and systems.
Another aspect emphasized by Gambardella and Torrisi (1998) is that business diversification might also impair sales or profit performance due to exogenous factors, namely the difficulties of putting in place the necessary downstream assets and capabilities that are required for commercialisation. This is the case with the electronics industry, where firms are narrowing the range of products while extending the range of ICTs in their knowledge base.
It should also be kept in mind that multi-technology profiles are not exclusive to the so-called knowledge economy or 'high-tech' sectors, those industries with a high R&D to sales ratio. For instance, there is evidence that industries like food processing have been developing new technological fields together with the extension of their more traditional technologies.
This industry has been dominated through most of its historical development in the industrial era by two main technological fields: machinery and chemicals (the latter often working through machinery, e.g., in refrigeration). Over the past two decades, these fields have been added in significant ways by newer technological fields, including advanced instrumentation (lasers, etc), electronics, Here we focus not on why firms diversify their product offerings, but on how their technology portfolios evolved during the 1980s and 1990s. We provocatively borrow and adapt the phrase 'corporate coherence' introduced by Dosi et al. (1992) to emphasize the often enigmatic amplitude and composition of the corporate knowledge base. One starting point is that even if the composition of their product portfolios is 'coherent', as argued by Dosi et al. (1992) , that does not mean that companies diversify into 'related' technological areas. Instead, different levels of knowledge are developed and maintained across different areas of interest not strictly related to the productive operations of firms. It is in this sense that we are interested in 'technological incoherence'. We propose to trace its evolution across industries as a possible way to learn about its underlying micromotives and strategic rationale.
The way in which technologies change their relative importance in companies' knowledge portfolios is an aspect that still gives us considerable room to expand our understanding of the multi-technology phenomena. The data constraint is traditionally severe in this regard, both because it is a recent phenomenon for which data is scarce and because it is difficult to make inter-temporal comparisons using technology indicators. The aim of this paper is precisely to contribute to the body of empirical papers analysing change in corporate technological diversification or incoherence.
It is also worth emphasising the boundaries between what we are and are not researching. Indeed, by referring to the notion of coherence in the context of technological competencies, we are adopting a substantive meaning that is similar to the approach advocated by Foss and Christensen's (2001) use of the term. In an applied paper, Christensen (2000) refers to coherence as an integrated process of generating and exploiting complementarities among innovative assets and learning activities. Also partially building on the resource-based approach, Teece and Pisano (1994) use the term 'dynamic capabilities' to refer to the strategic integration and adaptation of skills in a shifting environment, a key managerial ability for sustaining competitive advantage. Like them, we are concerned with the dynamic properties of technology economics and management. However, it should be made clear that we are not discussing the issue of technological coherence at the same ontological level, i.e. we do not provide an analysis of the dynamics of firm assets for technological innovation in the context of resource-based or competence perspectives. Given the limited scope of this paper, and because the empirical material used does not allow us to carry out such in-depth inquiry, the notion of capabilities is more instrumentally defined, as explained in the methodology section.
Theoretical and empirical research has frequently made the case that path-dependence should be expected in the accumulation of competencies. Either due to the fields of knowledge traditionally involved in manufacturing or due to the increasing complexity in coping with technological and organisational variables, this view argues that localised learning strongly constrains the directions of diversification von Tunzelmann 1998) . In a nutshell, the persistence of stable and industry-specific technological profiles is to be explained by the accumulation of capabilities in the conceptual framework of learning-by-doing and investments in R&D and human capital. The (Granstrand 1998; Pavitt 1998b ).
Recent research conspires, nevertheless, to complicate this picture of smooth and incremental change.
Utilising patent data from the Reading University database, Fai and von Tunzelmann (2001a) confirm that industry-specific competencies have endured throughout the last century and that differences in overall technological profiles remain quite distinct. Surprisingly enough, they find much stronger evidence of convergence in the direction of growing technologies across industries. In a related paper (Fai and von Tunzelmann 2001b) and new materials in the last two decades of the last century. An implication is that technology diversification can be related to the concept of long waves of techno-economic change and to studies characterising ICT as a core input or a general-purpose technology (Freeman and Louçã 2001) .
Paraphrasing a famous phrase of George Orwell: some technologies are more equal than others.
Technologies are not alike in terms of opportunities for future development and potential for interrelation with existing technologies. Long and medium-term changes in patenting can be related to changes in the importance of specific technologies for complex physical products and, therefore, for coping with the challenges of competition in increasingly sophisticated markets. We will explore this hypothesis in the context of the results of our empirical section.
In order to pursue this line of research, this paper will give an account of the technology families that drove technological diversification in the period under analysis. We will contrast the changes in the most dynamic technologies with the changes in the technologies that lost share in the patent portfolio of multi-technology companies in order to assess the destructive and/or complementary character of these changes. Differences between industrial sectors will be highlighted. From the examination of the 
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sectoral and technological shifts we will gather material for discussing the rationale(s) behind the underlying micro behaviour. In the next section, we present the methodology for our enquiry.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The database
Technological and sectoral evolution are discussed utilising data extracted from the SPRU database.
For the years 1980-85, 1985-90, and 1991-96 we have snapshots of accumulated patent counts broken down by 14 industries and 34 patent classes. This database contains more than half a million patents granted in the US for 463 of the largest U.S., European and Japanese companies distributed according to principal product group. Patents come already assigned to industries; therefore, we cannot perform intra-industry analysis because the patent database ignores the profiles of individual companies.
All patents are assigned one of 34 individual technological fields as well as one industry, that of the applicant company, following information provided by the US patent office. This database represents a huge effort of consolidation of 4500 subsidiaries and divisions carried out in SPRU since the mid1980s. Different assignee names, kept or bought by the 463 firms up to 1992, were identified using
Who Owns Whom and attributed to their parent company.
2
In our work with the SPRU database characteristics we had to take aboard its original technological classes. Notwithstanding this limitation, we subjected the original SPRU patent classes to our own recategorisation. Three reasons lie behind this reorganisation. The first is synthesis, i.e., simplification is important because patterns emerging from 34 individual classes times 14 sectors during 3 time periods are difficult to bear in mind or even to visualise at the same time. Second, new information on unexpected patterns can be gained with a new aggregation of patent categories. Finally, the reliability of conclusions is substantially upgraded by allowing for sensitivity testing. Thus, the reorganisation of the patent classification allows us to gain extra operational leverage in data manipulation and to achieve a more secure and profound scrutiny of patterns. 
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ChemApp Food&T TextWoodetc Other(weap.e tc) Source: SPRU's technological classes re-arranged by the author.
The new technological categories are constructed to represent families of associated technologies.
Since all classifications are imperfect conventions it is important to look at them critically. The U.S. patent system is a classification in which patents are clustered together keeping in mind function, effect and end product, although the same patent can have several industrial uses and be related to a wider technological area. However, there are grounds to believe, as do Narin and Olivastro (1988) , that it is possible to construct reasonable (re-)classifications according to criteria of technological similarity. This will only be an approximation but, in our case, the task is made easier as we build on the efforts that lead to the current SPRU database. For instance, under the ICT label we regroup technological areas that have been strongly influenced by the advent of the microchip and incorporate a strong digital element. The electrical group, on the other hand, is more difficult to put together; therefore, it is not as reliable as the former group in terms of internal consistence.
Finally, we follow Patel's (1999) table of correspondence between industries, defined by their principal product group, and 'core technical fields' (see Appendix 2). Although such a correspondence is never simple and straightforward, this information is precious. By measuring the proportion of patents granted outside the industries' traditional areas of technological expertise it becomes possible to assess the extent of technological diversity and changes in diversification in each industry and for the aggregate of all industries.
Interpreting patenting activity
The empirical section of this work attempts to capture technological capabilities through patent data.
Many studies refer to capabilities or competencies as technological knowledge that is created and reproduced by organizations and among them affecting the ability of firms to innovate in certain directions rather than others (Gambardella and Malerba 1999) . However, patents are only a very imperfect and indirect measure of industrially applicable knowledge. Many authors have examined the problems of using patents as an indicator of technological activity. 3 To minimize these problems we do not treat patents as proxies for inventive output resulting from R&D investment, and thus avoid a notion of 'knowledge production function' akin to the much-abused 'linear model of innovation'.
Three potential limitations must be noted in connection with this research.
Firstly, patents account for codified knowledge, whereas a main reason why firms and industries are different is due to firm-specific tacit knowledge emerging because different firms are exposed to different circumstances and learn different things differently (Nelson 1991 
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firm propensities to patent among different companies within a given national patenting system, as well as differences in the patenting patterns across technologies, across industries, across countries and over time (Patel and Pavitt 1995) . Thirdly, there are epistemological difficulties in the issue of measurement of competencies; ultimately, we have access only to the behaviour of technology indicators, not to knowledge structures or the corporate mechanisms that remain underneath and constitute the real unit of analysis (Lawson 1997) . Still, in spite of all these limitations, patents constitute a precious window (however narrow) into a deeper ontological level, namely, the potential to generate improved technical knowledge.
On the positive side, many authors agree that the U.S. patenting system is a particularly rich source of information, identifying it as a basis for international and, to a degree, inter-temporal comparisons (Narin and Olivastro 1988) . At present, two other observations strengthen the validity of patents to assess the technological evolution of big business institutions. Firstly, about 80% of all patents were granted to business firms in the last quarter of the twentieth century; of these, about half were granted to the world's largest innovative firms (Patel and Pavitt 1995) . Secondly, a recent survey questionnaire (Cohen, Nelson and Walsh 2000: 13) sent to 1478 R&D labs in the U.S. manufacturing sector suggests that patents have become more important as a protection strategy for product innovations in a growing number of industries since the early 1980s.
EMPIRICAL EXPLORATION
Overview of patenting trends
The empirical work of this paper assesses the magnitude of change in technological profiles among the world's largest innovative firms. Let us first draw a picture of the main developments taking place in our time period.
There is a substantial increase in the absolute number of patents granted to our population of large firms over time. Companies received a total of 274,904 patents in the period 1991-96, which corresponds to a variation of 81% when compared with the total patent counts in 1980-85: that is, almost twice as many patents. Individual patent classes behaved quite differently. Among those classes that experienced the highest increase in patents, ICT classes figure prominently. For instance, 'semiconductors' and 'computers' were the top two classes in terms of overall growth, with more than three times as many patents granted in the early 1990s than in the early 1980s. On the other extreme, two classes decreased in absolute terms. The 'inorganic chemistry' and the 'hydrocarbons' classes had less patents in 1991-95 than in 1980-85.
Accounting for growth in individual classes can be affected by the existence of small numbers in the initial period. Regrouping classes into groups of technology can supply a sensitivity test while giving us a more robust and manageable picture of the trends. Again, ICT grows more vigorously, now This pattern of growth occurred while the extent of technological diversification for all industries as a whole was essentially stable, or even decreasing: the proportion of patents obtained from outside core technological fields for the periods was 51. 5%, 50.7% and 48.3% for 1980-85, 1986-90 and 1991-96 respectively. About half of the patents generated by the companies in the database come from nonspecialist sectors. This confirms the multi-technological nature of the companies in our sample.
Moreover, taken together with the immense attractive power revealed by the three top technologies observed above, it suggests the occurrence of a considerable change in the structure of technological diversification. 
Changes in the structure of technological diversification
In order to assess the evolution of technological diversification we take a look at the distribution of patents granted outside 'core technical fields' for all industries taken together and compare it across sub-periods ( 
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ICT, materials and drugs & bioengineering: the contribution of non-specialist sectors
So far our empirical exploration has emphasised the uneven attractiveness of different technologies when companies patent outside their traditional competencies. The literature on technological diversification emphasises both variety within the firm as well as variety between firms. Due to the limitations of the data available we cannot go deeper than the industry level. Therefore we are constrained to apply a sectoral approach, which disregards inter-firm variability. This implies difficulty in producing generalizations. The examination of the main features of the three most attractive patent groups offers, nevertheless, interesting insights into the process of development of technological diversification in the last two decades of the twentieth century. We will now explore the role these key technologies play in the technology portfolio of different sectors.
Those industries in which ICT patents classes do not figure as 'core technical fields' contribute consistently with about 25% of all ICT patents throughout the three sub-periods. This has been an impressive performance by non-specialists, since ICT patenting by specialist sectors, i.e. computers and electrical/electronic industries, exploded during this time. Indeed, the growth in the volume of ICT patents originating in non-ICT sectors was much higher than the growth in patenting in ICT sectors.
The rate of variation of the ICT technology group between 1980-85 and 1991-96 was 223% for the non-specialist sectors, whereas for ICT specialists it was 177%. Meanwhile, the growth of non-ICT sectors was higher between 1980-85 and 1986-90, whereas ICT patenting grew more in ICT specialists than non-specialists between 1986-90 and 1991-96.
Additionally, while ICT industries have themselves been among those narrowing their technological scope and concentrating on their prime fields of expertise, ICTs have progressively broadened the industry base from which new patents are harvested (Mendonça 2002) . Indeed, all but the paper industry increased their patenting in ICT fields, but some industries more dramatically than others (see Table 5 .3). These findings need to be qualified. This stylised fact is very strong but the increase in the ICT share of the non-ICT industries' portfolios was slower during the periods 1986-90/1991-96. 
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for which ICT did not represent a large share of total patenting, are integrating that technological field in their knowledge portfolios rapidly and in a substantive way (Mendonça 2002 ). An apparent implication of these findings is that cutting-edge technology capabilities in not only in utilising, but also generating ICT are of key importance for an increasing number of large corporations in almost all sectors. However, it is not clear what this increasing pervasiveness in ICT activity really means. We will return to this issue in the next section. 
1991-96
Source: Elaborations on the SPRU database
The case of materials technology is different from ICT. Non-specialists have been the first contributors to the filing of patents in this technological category. Furthermore, the importance of the contribution of non-specialists to the total number of patents grew considerably over the time period of our analysis, starting from 70%, then 75%, and reaching 81% in 1991-96. A similarity with the ICT case is that the growth of the contribution of non-specialists was consistently higher than the growth in materials patenting by specialists sectors as can be seen in specialists' patenting growth is higher in the 1980s, whereas non-specialists perform comparatively better in the early nineties as shown in Table 5 .5. However, the greatest overall increase in patenting was experienced by non-specialist industries. 
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Comparing growth and growth differentials between technology groups
What are the parallels between the rates of variation of different technological groups? Such information can indicate which technologies that tend to be developed together by multi-technology firms. In Table 5 .6 we correlate the growth observed in patent counts by the different industries and find several statistically significant correlations. We see that between 1980-85 and 1991-96 growth tends to be positively correlated between technological fields that have some art-based similarities, which can hide a danger of spurious correlation. However, it is interesting to note that the strongest correlations involve two of our key technologies for technological diversification: materials and fine chemicals, ICT and electrical technology. It is also interesting to see that the growth in the new field of drugs & bioengineering seems detached from possible interrelations with other technological groups.
The data suggests that the 'new economy' technologies of ICT and materials co-evolve with the old.
There is no evidence that the growing technological opportunities emerging in these fields have 
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Creative accumulation appears to be the result, but the story does not have to end here. Trying to detect signs of substitution tendencies between technologies is a more subtle matter. We designed a complementary analysis in which we tried to assess the way in which each of the technology components of the different industries varied across time periods. For a given industrial sector the volume of patents in each technological group can grow but at different rates, so that certain components of the competence portfolio can systematically gain weight in relation to others.
Basically, if a technological group tends to enlarge as a component of an industry's technological portfolio this can mean that the technology is surpassing another technological field in terms of importance in the hierarchy of competencies in which the industry is active, given that propensities to patent in different patent classes remains constant. Using the terminology of Granstrand et al. (1997) this means that a certain technology can move from being marginal or niche to become a core technological field where the industry is increasingly committed and competent. Our aim is to detect these movements.
For each industry we computed the structure of the technology portfolios and found the percentage point change between 1980-85 and 1991-96. We then correlated the changes in technological groups.
We found only two statistically significant correlations, both negative. The growth in the drugs & bioengineering component of technology portfolios was found to be negatively correlated with fine chemicals technology at the 0.05 level, two-tailed test (= -0.647). The other significant correlation, this time at the 0.01 level, two-tailed, is between ICT and electrical technology ( = -0.681). In other words, the ICT and drugs & bioengineering components of technology portfolios register a rise in their share of total patents that is associated with a diminishing share of the other two older technologies. This is certainly evident in the case of ICT. As seen above, ICT and electrical patents grow together, but the rise of ICT is coupled with the fact that electrical technology loses ground in the average technology portfolio.
5.THE CHANGING COMPOSITION OF TECHNOLOGICAL DIVERSIFICATION
The role and importance of technologies differs across industries. There are, nevertheless, some regularities emerging in the process of technological diversification over time. The results show how ICT, new materials and drugs & bioengineering all exert a powerful influence on practically all sectors, not only on the industries that are specifically devoted to selling artefacts primarily based on them or produced with their assistance. An implication of this is that the technological diversification phenomenon has been changing. What is the nature of this change?
Over time multi-technology companies keep changing their capabilities while maintaining their previous heterogeneous, or incoherent, technological profiles. The literature mostly argues that technology profiles are industry-specific but is more ambivalent as to whether there should be any process of technological convergence between industries. However, the major point that emerges from the patterns observed in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office data is that 'old-tech' sectors give signs 
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of renewing their patent portfolios with new technologies. Our empirical exploration shows an accelerating pattern of convergence when companies from different industries patent outside their traditional fields of technological expertise. This is in line with previous findings using patents (Fai and von Tunzelmann 2001a) and fits with the tendencies of development of the major international networks of inter-firm alliances (Hagedoorn, Giuri and Mariani 2000) . Although the period covered by the data is not sufficient to test long wave arguments, our findings support the view that the new technological paradigms gradually influence all industrial sectors (Freeman and Louçã 2001) .
We find evidence of complementarity between pairs of technology groups as they grow together and are accumulated by companies. Nevertheless, as new technologies climb up the list of technologies patented by industries when they patent outside their 'core technical fields', the question arises as to whether there is some kind of creative rearrangement of the importance of capabilities in the distributed competences in the profiles of companies. It may be that new technologies increasingly replace old ones in some key coordinating roles of corporate technology systems. 8 At the present level of analysis, we can only suggest very indirect ways of testing such a hypothesis.
The analysis focused primarily on technologies, rather than industries. We adopted the notion of corporate coherence used to refer to related diversification at the product level and adapted it to refer explicitly to the corporate knowledge base. We sought to develop an understanding of the behaviour One hypothesis is that ICT has the potential to 'fuse' with many different technologies and that the resulting new technologies are likely to play a particular role in creating new areas of technological interconnectedness in the current paradigm (Cantwell and Santangelo 2000) . 10 This might have implications not only for product design and process improvement, but also for the ability of the firm to manage the competitive forces it faces. In our tentative approach to this question, we are compelled to frame the phenomenon of the evolving corporate technological profiles in the context of a larger historical transition between technoeconomic paradigms. Changes are rapid for such a short period and presumably encouraged by high technological opportunities and associated profit prospects (Dalum et al. 1999) . It is more difficult to speculate about the micro-motives that contribute to attract industries from their path-dependent technological trajectories. We suggest two related interpretations.
Firstly, as specific new technologies become a vital element of the innovative and productive system, the governance of that system will start to depend critically on the knowledge of the principles of the new technologies. Sophisticated knowledge and numerous patent claims emerge therefore as strategic assets that companies use with the intention of managing technological and productive relations with other players of the national (and international) system of innovation and the web of relations in which the firm is embedded. Intellectual advantage can be used to manage relations with innovative suppliers, but also with rivals, buyers, potential entrants, producers of substitute products, universities, government labs, regulators, etc. One remaining source of advantage is internal R&D activity, which enables the large innovative organisation to gain a degree of autonomy in generating advanced technological capabilities in the newly important fields. In this sense, R&D can have a third face, since it can enable the company to coordinate its competitive and collaborative environments. The discussion around multi-technology firms as system integrators and knowledge brokers promises interesting insights (Pavitt in this volume).
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Secondly, one way to explain the persistent, but changing, incomplete technological coherence of established industrial giants is to probe the potential reasons as to why a variety of internal capabilities may play an important role in the reproduction of organizations. Knowledge of key technologies may be critical for large firms to sustain themselves as central knots in a web of technological and economic relations. However, long-term corporate survival implies renewing technological and organizational capabilities and this means continuously opening technological options, as they are costly to develop and the evolution of the business environment is uncertain. The managerial implication is that tolerance of activities at the margin and willingness to experiment within the boundaries of the firm is a way to keep stretching the understanding of possibilities and preventing old competence configurations from becoming rigidities (de Geus 1997). As Hodgson (1999: 26) puts it in his description of the so-called 'impurity principle', every socio-economic system relies on at least one 'structurally dissimilar subsystem' in order to function. Following these ideas, a more organizational line of research would assess the specific mechanisms by which technological incoherence or impurity facilitates corporate learning and renovation.
The last topic of this section has to be methodology. There is always the possibility that the patterns extracted from the dataset are due to spurious turbulence in the patent indicator. Recent research on patenting practice (Cohen et al. 2000; Hicks et al. 2001; Jaffe 2000) does not point to variations on propensities to patent that would make the observed shifts in patenting a function of non-systematic 
